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Abstract 
Introduction Food insecurity is associated with increased risk for several health conditions 
and with poor chronic disease management.  Key determinants for household food 
insecurity are income and food costs. Whereas short-term household incomes are likely to 
remain static, increased food prices would be a significant driver of food insecurity. 
Objectives To investigate food price drivers for household food security and its health 
consequences in the United Kingdom under scenarios of Deal and No deal for Britain’s exit 
from the European Union.  To estimate the 5% and 95% quantiles of the projected price 
distributions.  
Design Structured expert judgement elicitation, a well-established method for quantifying 
uncertainty, using experts. In July 2018, each expert estimated the median, 5% and 95% 
quantiles of changes in price for ten food categories under Brexit Deal and No-deal to June 
2020 assuming Brexit had taken place on 29th March 2019.  These were aggregated based 
on the accuracy and informativeness of the experts on calibration questions. 
Participants Ten specialists with expertise in food procurement, retail, agriculture, 
economics, statistics and household food security. 
Results  when combined in proportions used to calculate Consumer Prices Index food basket 
costs, median food price change for Brexit with a Deal is expected to be +6.1% [90% credible 
interval:-3%, +17%] and with No deal +22.5% [+1%, +52%] 
Conclusions  
The number of households experiencing food insecurity and its severity are likely to increase 
because of expected sizeable increases in median food prices after Brexit.  Higher increases 
are more likely than lower rises and towards the upper limits, these would entail severe 
impacts.  Research showing a low food budget leads to increasingly poor diet suggests that 
demand for health services in both the short and longer term is likely to increase due to the 
effects of food insecurity on the incidence and management of diet-sensitive conditions. 
 
Keywords Brexit  Food prices  Consumer Price Index  Structured expert judgement  Uncertainty 
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INTRODUCTION 
Food insecurity, the lack of access to sufficient nutritious food, is associated with multiple 
negative outcomes including  diet-sensitive chronic diseases. An important driver of household 
food security is the costs of food and other essentials relative to incomes. In 2016, the United 
Kingdom (UK) voted to relinquish its membership of the European Union (EU), known 
colloquially as ‘Brexit’, to be completed by 29 March 2019.   UK reliance on food imports, 
including from EU, is significant and food price rises have been widely forecast (1). 
 
One of the motivations for investigating possible impacts of Brexit on food prices is that, over 
the last few years, medical General Practitioners in the UK have raised concerns about food 
insecure patients seeking referrals to food banks (2) and that food insecurity is affecting 
medication compliance, health and wellbeing (3).  This has raised concern about resource 
implications for surgeries (4) and that “the welfare system is failing to provide a robust last line 
of defence against hunger”(5).   
 
A 2017 survey showed 13% of people were worried that their food would run out before they 
got money to buy more (‘marginally food secure households’) and 8% couldn’t afford to eat 
balanced meals or went hungry (‘low or very low food secure households’)(6) . In low income 
households, 29% experience food insecurity(7). Lower-income households inevitably allocate 
a higher proportion of spending on food, and buy a similar fraction of imported food; therefore, 
low-income households are more exposed to food price rises.  In November 2018 the United 
Nations OHCHR special rapporteur issued a statement in which he argued that the rising use 
food banks in the UK is a consequence of poverty, including in-work poverty. He 
recommended that the UK government should begin to measure and monitor food security (8). 
 
Absolute income levels and volatility are both important drivers of household food insecurity 
(9, 10).  There was little growth in real earnings in 2017–18, and the Office for Budget 
Responsibility forecast slow earnings growth for the following four years(11).  This means that 
the main driver of household food insecurity will be food price. UK price inflation is measured 
by changes in the UK Consumer Prices Index (CPI). The CPI is based on a ‘shopping basket’ 
of goods and services, including a food element. In November 2018, the CPI inflation was 
2.3% p.a. over all items and 0.5% p.a. for the food element (12). The CPI is based on actual 
Strengths limitations of this study 
 
 First study to quantify anticipated food price changes and associated uncertainty 
relating to Brexit Deal and No deal scenarios using a transparent and established 
protocol, and to articulate links to potential healthcare impacts. 
 Inclusion of experts with broad and overlapping areas of expertise in food 
production and supply. 
 Scenario analysis showing how price changes in linked food categories could 
combine to affect overall food costs. 
 Fewer than optimal number of experts elicited. 
 Study was undertaken on the assumption that Brexit would occur on 29th March 
2019. Delays and major ambiguities with respect to eventual Brexit circumstances 
have emerged since experts made projections in 2018. 
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consumer spending and the food element incorporates both spending on healthy nutrition and 
on less healthy options. CPI alone cannot indicate if consumers are shifting towards less healthy 
diets because confounding effects are smoothed out across income ranges. 
 
Consequences of food insecurity on diet-sensitive chronic diseases, including hypertension, 
hyperlipidaemia, and diabetes(13-19), is significant.  Other effects include poor educational 
attainment, poor mental health and social isolation, which increases mortality(20). People on 
lower incomes report shopping for cheaper foods and eating less (6), eating more high fat, salty, 
sugar-sweetened foods, and processed meat (21).  Fruit and vegetable consumption is lower in 
low income households (22). The medical importance of a basic nutritional safety net has long 
been recognised by policymakers through the Welfare Food Scheme and Healthy Start  
programmes. A recent systematic review identifies poor diet quality as an important 
preventable risk factor for non-communicable disease, responsible for one-in-five deaths 
globally and 127 deaths per 100,000 Britons(23). Under post-2008 austerity measures, cuts 
have been made to Healthy Start and other provisions. The UK’s main response to growing 
food insecurity has been charitable food relief, but the efficacy of these and similar approaches 
is unmeasured. Social protection spending and welfare state interventions are the only actions 
known to alter the prevalence of household food insecurity(24). The rise in food bank use is 
attributed largely to welfare cuts(4).  Despite the purported end of austerity, the inability of 
some households to feed themselves adequately persists.  Figures from the Trussell Trust, the 
UK’s largest network of foodbanks, show 658,048 three-day emergency food supplies were 
issued in the 6 months to September 2018, an increase of 13% over the same period in 2017 
(25).   
 
 
The UK is deeply integrated with the EU and its decision to exit from this trading block has no 
parallels in modern history(26). Almost one-half of the UK’s food is imported: 30% comes 
from the EU, and another 11% comes from non-EU countries under the terms of trade deals 
negotiated by the EU.  Prices of fruit and vegetables are particularly vulnerable to vagaries of 
production and supply(1).  In estimates of the economic impact of Brexit on the UK, the least 
damaging scenarios are those which are closest to the current situation under EU membership 
(i.e. retaining membership of the Single Market and Customs Union), while a ‘no-deal’ 
scenario is predicted to be the most damaging(27).  
In setting a comprehensive strategy for the UK to ensure household food security, policymakers 
must grapple with how to prioritise low food prices, animal welfare, minimum income, health, 
welfare and social protection.  
 
In anticipation of Brexit in March 2019, we conducted an elicitation of a group of experts in 
July 2018 on their expectations for possible impacts of two Brexit scenarios on food prices 
over the 14 months following Brexit (i.e. to June 2020). This period was chosen to recognise 
that there is a period of transition to any new regime and that what we are interested in is how 
post Brexit food prices will settle to after the initial volatility. Experts were asked to integrate 
into their judgements all factors relevant to the changing of food prices at current exchange 
rates. 
 
 
    
 
METHODS  
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A projection of food prices gives a key insight into the effects of unprecedented events on 
household food security and contingent health consequences. As far as we know, no projections 
have been published for the impact of Brexit on food prices or CPI which enumerate associated 
uncertainties formally. That said, one new study has estimated potential impacts of Brexit on 
the prices of fruits and vegetables and the uncertainties in these using Monte Carlo simulation 
(28). Other studies provided only point estimates. We report key findings from the application 
of a structured expert judgement (SEJ) elicitation to potential food price changes and their 
uncertainties in the event of Brexit under two scenarios: ‘Deal’ and ‘No-deal’.  By Brexit deal 
we mean with trading arrangements broadly similar to the present. With Brexit no-deal we 
mean that such arrangements will be discontinued and individual trade deals would need to be 
negotiated.  
Since SEJ involves the combination of expert judgement, diversity of experts is more important 
than large numbers. Literature supports 8–15 experts as a viable number in practice; having 
greater numbers may not significantly impact the findings and would incur extra expense and 
time. Having fewer than five experts reduces the prospect of providing adequate diversity of 
views and could weaken the strength of the inferences(29). We identified potential experts 
through literature search and scanning webpages of relevant organisations.  We sent invitations 
to 43 individuals whose expertise represented a wide range within the domain. Of these, only 
six were able to spend three days at the elicitation workshop, so we rescheduled and sent out 
another tranche of 67 invitations.  Again only six could commit to the workshop, so we 
rescheduled once more, expanded our list of potential experts and issued 81 invitations. 
Following this iteration, we decided to go ahead with the six external experts and supplement 
the panel with additional academic colleagues. Two external experts were then late withdrawals 
from the panel, so added two more academic volunteers with relevant expertise bring the panel 
up to ten specialists in all.  Our panel (see Acknowledgments) had expertise in food 
procurement, retail, agriculture, economics, statistics and household food security, and each 
expert considered potential impacts of the Brexit scenarios on prices separately for each of ten 
food categories that are used in the UK Consumer Prices Index (CPI). We then used these 
results to explore a number of scenarios. 
 
Structured expert judgement 
 
Structured expert judgement (SEJ) elicitation provides a formal approach for estimating 
uncertain quantities according to current professional knowledge and understanding, and has 
been utilised in a wide range of applications. To amalgamate our experts' judgements, we used 
Cooke’s Classical Model, a well-established, validated approach (30-33).   Cooke’s method 
uses a mathematical scoring rule basis to evaluate empirical performance-based weights for 
aggregating individual experts’ judgements. This means that when all the individual estimates 
are combined, the experts who were most informative and most accurate on a set of related 
calibration questions (to which only the analysts had the answers) contributed most to the final 
estimates of the questions of interest (34). 
 
The independent facilitator (WA) devised calibration questions based on historic food price 
changes. The questions of interest were future food price changes.  We began by discussing 
with the group the wordings and meanings of the questions, to minimise ambiguities or 
misunderstandings. The experts themselves then clarified and revised several of the target 
questions. 
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For both calibration questions and target questions, we asked the experts to integrate, within 
their judgements, all the factors and circumstances under which food prices could be driven up 
or down.  Each expert provided their own estimates, confidentially to the facilitator (WA), for 
the lowest plausible, highest plausible and best estimate for price change for each food category 
under the specific scenario. We discussed with the experts that we would treat their three 
judgement values for each item in the subsequent analysis as analogous to a 90% credible 
interval range, with their best estimate value representing the median of their uncertainty 
spread.  We made clear that a median value need not necessarily be central to the credible 
interval if, in the expert’s judgement, the relevant uncertainty distribution is not symmetric and 
should exhibit skewness (either to higher or lower values). More details are given in 
supplementary material 2. 
 
This confidential elicitation procedure encourages participants to express judgements based on 
their true beliefs, reducing potential sources of bias due to peer- and group influences. We also 
maintained anonymity when presenting the individual judgements and weights derived from 
the calibration questions.  
 
 
Analysis of Elicitation 
 
We aggregated mathematically individual uncertainty distributions for each food category to 
construct food price change probability density functions, using the performance-based 
weights derived from the expert calibration step in the Cooke’s Classical Model (30).  
 
We processed our experts’ responses using the program EXCALIBUR (35, 36), which 
computes weighted combinations of judgements and produces a synthesis for each food item 
expressed in terms of the same three quantiles used in the elicitation (i.e. 5th; 50th and 95th 
percentiles). We report in the next section both the overall food price change using the category 
weights employed by the CPI and  those for a  healthy basket based on McMahon and Weld 
(2015)(37).   
 
Computing Brexit-related Food Basket Cost Changes 
 
In order to estimate price change distributions for different shopping baskets under the two 
Brexit scenarios we use the Bayes Net (BN) code UNINET (38). BNs are graphical tools for 
representing and computing high dimensional joint uncertainty distributions (39, 40). Our BN 
for calculating food basket price changes post-Brexit is shown in Figure 1. 
 
In post-processing the elicitation data it was recognised that implicit correlations existed 
between certain foodstuff prices in the judgments of many of the experts. Ideally, such 
correlations need to be accounted for in an uncertainty analysis to avoid creating spurious 
results; here, to mitigate their absence, we adopted approximate correlation values from our 
knowledge of foodstuff pricing. 
The converse assumption, that food prices are independent, introduces the risk of under-
estimating the joint extent of interrelated changes on distribution tails. 
 
Vegetable and fruit prices are correlated by a mutual dependency on weather conditions. 
However, both within and between food categories there can be differential effects on different 
crops: for example, spring floods which rot potatoes and delay grain sowing do no harm to 
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orchards, which suffer if there is an unseasonal frost as the fruit is setting. We set this 
correlation at about +0.75  
 
Corn and sugar beet are used as feed for cattle, inducing a correlation between meat and grain 
(bread), and between meat and sugar; we set these correlations each at +0.4.  While dairy and 
beef cattle markets are quite distinct, their prices are linked through a common dependency on 
feed costs, so we link milk and meat with a correlation +0.4. 
 
Grain (bread) and sugar (beet) can both be feedstock for biofuel and thus are linked via oil 
price; to account for this and other, secondary joint correlations, we set this correlation to +0.72.  
In fact, all food prices are linked to oil price through production and transport costs, but these 
two more strongly. 
 
The 2016 ‘sugar tax’ saw food producers make a substantial switch to artificial sweeteners, 
smaller serving sizes etc., to avoid significant price rises being passed to the consumer.  In light 
of this, we set the correlation between sugar and soft drinks to a relatively low value of +0.3. 
 
 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
We present estimated projected price changes by June 2020, assuming Brexit on 29th March 
2019, using food price change quantiles elicited at food category level (Table 1). We use the 
BN in Figure 1 to combine these price changes and associated uncertainties for the food 
element of the CPI basket, and to estimate monetised equivalents for specific family types 
based on McMahon and Weld (2015).  We discuss the likely effects on health and the demand 
for health services. The results of the analysis are in Table 1 and are shown graphically in 
Figure A1. Negative values indicate that the experts judge that, under a given scenario, some 
prices could conceivably go down, as well as up, albeit with low probabilities. 
 
 
Food category percentage price changes by June 2020 
 median (5th, 95th percentile) 
CPI category Brexit deal Brexit no-deal 
Soft drinks etc. 6 (0, 26) 8 (0, 47) 
Coffee, tea & cocoa 2 (-9, 19) 4 (-5, 69) 
Sugar, jam, etc. 7 (-9, 20) 19 (-5, 82) 
Vegetables 3 (-10, 20) 9 (-18, 63) 
Fruit 5 (-10, 24) 16 (-8, 51) 
Oil & fats 5 (-9, 20) 18 (-8, 87) 
Milk, cheese & eggs 6 (-9, 20) 23 (-5, 82) 
Fish 4 (-9, 19) 5 (-13, 41) 
Meat 6 (-10, 29) 18 (-11, 80) 
Bread & Cereals 4 (-9, 19) 10 (-7, 83) 
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 Table 1 Aggregated food prices change estimates. “Brexit deal” means a deal similar to the present 
arrangements will be implemented, so little disruption or additional costs to supply routes. “Brexit no-deal” 
means that such arrangements will be discontinued and individual trade deals would need to be negotiated. 
Numerical values are medians (90% credible intervals). *Based on ONS Table A2 2018 year end data (Mar 2018): 
selected Basket sub-Food category weekly costs; total for the ten items = £58.00.  **Based on MacMahon and 
Weld (2015) Northern Ireland minimum essential Healthy Basket sub-Food category weekly costs at November 
2014 Tesco prices. For two adults and two children, one in pre-school (aged 2-4) and one in primary school (aged 
6-11), total cost for the ten items = £93.56; for a single pensioner, the corresponding selected items cost = £35.44. 
 
Using the ONS food category weightings, we aggregate their contributions to a CPI basket.  
We see that, under a Brexit deal, this gives expected median food price rises around +6% (i.e. 
a rise 12 times higher than in 2018) by June 2020, with a plausible, i.e. 1-in-20 (5%) likelihood 
of a drop in prices of about -3% or more and a 1-in-20 chance of a rise of +17% or more. Under 
Brexit no-deal, the overall median food price escalation is expected to be +23%, with a lower 
plausible increase of about +1% and upper plausible increase of about +52% (again, each bound 
has a 1-in-20 chance of being exceeded).  
 
Thus, the foreseeable most likely outcome of Brexit is significant price rises. This will lead to 
more household food insecurity and its attendant deterioration in health and increase in demand 
for health services. 
 
What-if scenario sensitivity testing 
 
We wished to investigate how sensitive the overall basket food cost results are to a single food 
type.  Currently the only UK differentials from global prices are beef and poultry, where the 
EU’s production standards are higher than the rest of the world (41).  This suggests that 
constraining price rises for these foods following Brexit might be achieved principally by 
lowering animal welfare and food hygiene standards, with associated risks to human health.   
 
We set cost of meat to its 5th percentile level and then its 95th percentile level and investigated 
the effects on the overall food basket cost, with other food types unchanged. The resulting 
changes to the CPI Food Basket and to the Family Basket cost projections reported in Table 2 
and Figures A2 and A3. 
 
Overall % change ONS 
CPI sub-Foods, with 
category weights 
Mean +6.4% ± 6.0   
Median +6.1% [-2.7, +16.9] 
Mean +24.0% ± 15.4 
Median +22.5% [+1.49, +51.7] 
 Food basket cost changes by June 2020 (in £’s) 
Change in CPI weekly 
cost relative to 2018 year 
end Basket total £58.00*  
Mean +£3.78 ± £3.76 
Median +£3.53 [-£1.90, 
+£10.41] 
Mean +£13.97 ± £9.52 
Median +£13.00 [+£0.08, +£31.02] 
Change in family of 4 
Healthy Food Basket 
basis weekly cost 
£93.56**  
Mean +£6.30 ± £6.71 
Median +£5.80 [-£3.68, 
+£18.17] 
 Mean +£22.58 ± £16.14 
 Median+£20.98 [-£1.07, +£50.98] 
Change in single 
pensioner Healthy Food 
Basket basis weekly cost 
£35.44** 
Mean +£2.28 ± £2.56 
 Median +£2.09 [-£1.51, 
+£6.80] 
Mean +£8.11 ± £6.23 
 Median +£7.55 [-£1.05, +£18.99] 
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Meat price impacts on food basket mean costs: Scenario-based Bayes Net analytical 
conditioning 
Scenario 
CPI Basket sub-
foods cost: 
mean 
percentage 
change* 
Family basket: 
mean cost change* 
CPI Basket sub-
foods cost: 
95%ile percentage 
change* 
Family basket: 
95%ile cost change* 
Meat price → projected 5th percentile cost 
Deal 
[Meat cost 
-10%] 
-0.1%  (+6.4%) -£1.26  (+£3.78) +6.2%  (+16.9%) +£5.01  (+£10.41) 
No deal 
[Meat cost 
-11%] 
+8.6%  (+24.0%) +£5.71  (+£13.97) +24.4%  (+51.7%) +£21.13  (+£31.02) 
Meat price → projected 95th percentile cost 
Deal 
[Meat cost 
+29%] 
+13.5%  (+6.4%) +£14.66  (+£3.78) +20.6%  (+16.9%} +£21.61  (+£10.41) 
No deal 
[Meat cost 
+80%] 
+44.0%  (+24.0%) +£44.84  (+£13.97) +62.2%  (+51.7%) +£61.56  (+£31.02) 
Table 2 Example impacts on CPI and Family Food Basket costs from analytical conditioning the Bayes 
Net to the 5th percentile and 95th percentile projected costs of Meat, under Brexit Deal and No deal 
scenarios. 
(* Corresponding base model results are shown in brackets.) 
 
With meat cost at 5th percentile levels in the elicitation distributions (-10% and -11%, deal & 
no-deal respectively, see Table 1), the CPI Basket mean change for Brexit Deal becomes -0.1% 
(cf +6.4%) and the Family Basket mean cost changes from +£3.78 to -£1.26.  Under the Brexit 
No-deal scenario the CPI Basket mean change would be +8.6% (cf +24.0%) and, for the Family 
Basket, the cost increase becomes +£5.71 (c.f. +£13.97). 
 
With meat cost at 95th percentile levels from the elicitation Deal and No-deal distributions 
(+29% and +80%, respectively) the CPI Basket mean change for Brexit deal increases from 
+6.4% to + 13.5% and the Family Basket mean cost rises from +£3.78 to +£14.66.  Under the 
Brexit No-deal scenario the Family Basket, the mean change would be +44.0% (cf+24.0%) the 
cost increase becomes +£44.84 (c.f. +£13.97). 
 
The mean (expected) CPI Basket and Family Basket cost changes would be kept close to zero 
only if Meat prices were, somehow, limited to near their projected 5th percentile levels - and, 
with them, the price changes of foods correlated with Meat were also curbed - and then only 
under the Brexit Deal scenario.  Otherwise, higher Meat prices will inevitably amplify basket 
cost changes.  The standard deviations on the means are smaller under these Meat price 
sensitivity tests, and the correlation structure reduces the kurtosis of the distributions.  
 
Although there are some notable differences in the item price compositions of the CPI food 
basket and the family ‘healthy’ food basket (e.g. lower spend in UK CPI basket on meat: £12.80 
- v- £30.18 per week for Northern Ireland), our analysis shows that overall cost percentage 
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changes in these two representative household food baskets differ little: for Brexit no-deal, 
both estimates represent about +22% increases in projected mean costs.  
 
We selected meat for this sensitivity analysis as it the most likely to change in price depending 
on the details of any trade deals agreed.  For other foods or combinations of foods, the opposite 
may apply; similar sensitivity analyses are possible. 
 
The key finding is that the most likely effect of Brexit on food prices as calculated using the 
CPI method is a median rise of 6% if there is a deal and 23% if there is no deal. These represent 
significant additional costs for household budgets and are highly likely to lead to poorer diets 
with the concomitant effects on diet-related health. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Principal findings 
Food price rises after Brexit are likely to be significant and may be substantial and changes 
will be felt by the whole population very quickly(1).  In the light of the expected stagnation of 
household incomes, this is likely to drive more households into food insecurity. Food is a 
substantial portion of household expenditure, especially in low-income households(1). 
MacMahon and Weld (37) found that, after housing and childcare costs, the highest category 
of household expenditure in Northern Ireland is on a minimum essential ‘healthy’ food basket.  
They found food costs to be more expensive in rural areas for all household types and the 
highest spend was on meat, followed by the category fruit and vegetables.  Those households 
buying most would, of course, incur the greatest actual spend increases, with concomitant 
implications for affordability in terms of differing household-related incomes. The well-
established links between lower budgets available for food and lower diet quality lead to the 
expectation of multiple negative outcomes. Nutrient-dense foods, such as fruits and vegetables, 
are often more expensive and less available in lower-income neighbourhoods when compared 
with processed foods. Processed foods are generally inexpensive and highly accessible. They 
are energy-dense, high in added fats, sugar, or salt, and often considered highly palatable with 
addictive potential (21). Increasing numbers of patients with this kind of diet will likely drive 
increases in the incidence of diet-sensitive chronic diseases in the longer term, such as 
hypertension, hyperlipidaemia, and diabetes (13-19). The downturn in fruit and vegetable 
intake has been estimated between 2.5% and 11.4%, dependent on the Brexit trade agreement, 
with increasing cardiovascular disease mortality (28). This in turn will drive increased demands 
on the health services.  In the short term, this might manifest in reduced control of existing 
chronic conditions such as diabetes, coeliac disease, and hypertension, leading to demand on 
front-line and general practice services. 
Strengths and weaknesses of the study 
One strength of our analysis is that the expert judgement median estimates we obtain by 
elicitation are consistent with central estimates produced by UK Trade Policy Observatory and 
by the British Retail consortium(1)  and other modelling studies (28). However, we add further 
information for decision support by presenting quantified uncertainties around our estimates.  
These spreads can be substantial and all exhibit skew in the form of extended, ‘heavy’ upper 
tails – i.e. larger price increases are more likely than smaller increases (or reductions).  Related 
decision-making that is based only on central (average) estimates and neglects these 
uncertainties can lead to poor policy selection (42).   
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Policymakers benefit from consideration of a defined reasonable worst case for contingency 
planning, and are proficient at interpreting probabilistic statements, which help clarify 
underlying assumptions(43).  Moreover, historic vegetable CPI rises offer a perspective for the 
elicited credible intervals for CPI vegetable price change in Table 1.  The largest historic one-
year change in vegetable prices since 1987 was +14.8% (2006-7) and the largest two-year jump 
was +27.1%, for the period 2006 to 2008.  Compared to the Brexit deal scenario, the record 
two-year rise is greater than the elicited 95th percentile vegetable price index change (i.e. +20% 
by June 2020, two-years ahead from the elicitation), and falls within the 90% credible interval 
for Brexit No-deal;, the projected 95th percentile change could exceed +63% under this 
scenario.  One weakness of the study was that we had fewer than the optimal number of experts.  
Whilst the spread of expertise was good, a wider spread of expertise could have improved 
quantification of price changes, possibly narrowing the uncertainty around the central 
estimates. 
 
Strengths and weaknesses in relation to other studies 
Although updating is warranted, our likely price change projections exemplify a basis for 
undertaking detailed modelling of impacts on health and healthcare provision under the two 
alternative Brexit scenarios. Most  attempts to quantify food prices after Brexit have not been 
set within the context of health and healthcare provision, nor have they quantified the 
uncertainty in such estimates; one notable exception is the estimation of the potential impacts 
of fruit and vegetable price increases on cardiovascular disease (28).Whilst the experience of 
food insecurity is largely driven by the cost of food and other essentials relative to incomes, 
other factors such as self-efficacy, access to credit and other forms of social capital are also 
significant (44).  
 
Meaning of the study The likely effect of Brexit, under either scenario, is a significant rise in 
food prices. Unless the rising tide of food insecurity is reversed, health costs will continue to 
rise with implications for health and clinician workloads. Our findings should alert 
policymakers to the potential for significant increases in food costs under either Brexit 
scenario, with major impacts likely to follow a no-deal outcome.  The expected levels of these 
increases and, more importantly, the uncertainty spreads on the estimates - all of which are 
skewed moderately toward higher costs - should inform policies that allow households to afford 
minimum essential food baskets, meeting acceptable physical, psychological and social needs.  
One likely corollary to substantial post Brexit food price rises is even greater consumption of 
cheaper, less healthy diets, with inevitable impacts on population long-term health trends and 
demands on the NHS.  Medical practitioners and health care workers are amongst those who 
will have to confront the related challenges if food prices rise sharply and substantially after 
Brexit.  Clinicians may need to organise processes to cope with the demand from food insecure 
patients for referrals to foodbanks. The management of chronic conditions may deteriorate, 
increasing the need for intervention.  Food insecurity in the present may also increase 
healthcare demand in the longer term.  Policies that support incomes and access to food are the 
only interventions that have a demonstrable positive effect on food insecurity. It is incumbent 
on policymakers to ensure that the last line of defence against hunger is robust in order to 
promote well-being, productivity and healthy ageing. 
 
Current evidence on the efficacy of some of the most widespread current responses to food 
insecurity, such as foodbanks, is limited. More research is needed in order to select the most 
effective strategies for supporting health and well-being. While Brexit did not take place by 
the due date, and the overall political situation is now even less clear than before, certain aspects 
of potential impacts on food supplies have become more explicit. For example, the impact of 
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stockpiling on non-perishable food prices can be now ascertained more accurately, as those 
costs can be quantified.  In other respects, however, uncertainties associated with post-Brexit 
food pricing are likely to have increased.  For instance, at the time of writing (December 2019), 
the current target date for Brexit has moved to 31 January 2020, and  might be postponed even 
later.  Inevitably, the precise timing of Brexit will have an impact on the prices of fresh foods 
due to the seasonal nature of such produce.  
 
Unanswered questions and future research 
Given almost everything concerning Brexit is in a state of flux at the time of writing, it is our 
intention to conduct an updating elicitation, once the circumstances surrounding how Brexit 
will be implemented become clearer. Experts who participated in our 2018 elicitation have 
expressed a universal interest in re-visiting the issues and factors, and in reviewing their 
judgements of future food prices and the related uncertainties. We will consider increasing 
membership of the panel of experts to obtain an even wider sample of judgements. One 
advantage of this repeat elicitation would be the opportunity to investigate how much the 
quantified uncertainties, reported here, may have changed.  When we know the terms of Brexit, 
an elicitation update will be able to quantify possible adjustments to the present estimates. In 
addition, we intend to explore in more quantitative detail possible underlying correlations 
between prices of different foodstuffs. New advances in elicitation techniques for assessing 
parameter dependences (45) offer a ratifiable basis for quantifying the properties of such  
correlations. It seems inevitable that the implications of an eventual Brexit for projected food 
price forecasts will be fundamental to, and crucial for policy planning in many societal and 
political areas. 
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Figure 1 Bayes Net structure for calculating distributions for food basket price changes (ellipses with 
black ends) due to elicited judgments on individual foodstuff price movements under Brexit Deal and 
No Deal scenarios: percentage change in CPI Food Basket cost; cost change in £ for CPI Food Basket, 
and for two household baskets. The information nodes in the upper half of the BBN (Bread; Meat .. 
etc) comprise uncertainty distributions on price movements per foodstuff for the Brexit Deal 
scenario; the nodes in the lower half (BreadX; MeatX .. etc) represent uncertainty judgments for 
foodstuff price movements under a Brexit No Deal scenario.  The quantified changes in the basic CPI 
Basket(s) are factored with ONS foodstuff weights (node “Wts”).  Numerical distribution statistics for 
the output nodes are summarised on Table 1. (See Supplementary Information 1 for further details). 
 
